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Abstract
We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outomces in continuous time,
double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. Since competitive
equilibria need not exist in markets with price contols, we investigated the nature of
non-price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a
quality competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria always exist in such
price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilib-
ria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria
in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market
outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls
induce non-price competition between agents both in theory and in the experimen-
tal environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the
model.
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1 Introduction
We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double
auction markets in which both price and quality can vary. Price controls are a pervasive
form of government regulation: rent control, the minimum wage, and price supports for
agricultural commodities are all common instances. Alterations in product quality have
been suggested as an equilibrium response to the inability of the market to adjust supply
and demand by price changes.1 Indeed, a number of works support the possibility that
price controls induce quality competition in various regulated industries2, and other research
investigates how job characteristics such as the amount of employer-supplied training are
affected by the minimum wage.3 However, theoretical inquiry into this phenomenon has
been frustrated by the fact that competitive equilibria may fail to exist when price controls
are imposed.4
Due to this lack of a theoretical foundation, we conducted exploratory experiments of
multi-quality markets where price controls were imposed. Two sets of experiments were
conducted. Series 1 was designed to test the intuition that, when no price floors were
imposed, agents would trade goods at the quality that maximized joint surplus, and when a
price floor was imposed, agents would trade higher (and more expensive) quality goods for
which joint surplus was lower.
Figure 1 illustrates the substance of Series 1 experiments, in which agents were placed
in a market environment where buyers and sellers may transact at any of ten qualities,
1Such an effect has been suggested by Feldstein (1973), Leﬄer (1982), and Hashimoto (1982), among
others.
2See Plott (1965) for an analysis of non-price competition by regulated dry cleaners,
Douglas and Miller III (1974) for an analysis of non-price competition by airlines, and Joskow (1980) for
an analysis of non-price competition by hospitals.
3See Hashimoto (1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2001).
4In general equilibrium theory, work by Dre´ze (1975) and van der Laan (1980) showed the existence of
l-equilibria for markets with price restrictions by showing that there exists a set of ad hoc supply/demand
constraints on agents such that, given these constraints, there exists equilibrium prices. However, for markets
with indivisible goods (such as those considered in this work), competitive equilibria are only guaranteed to
exist when agents’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition; see Gul and Stacchetti (1999). How-
ever, even when preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition, the existence of a competitive equilibrium
can not be guaranteed when price controls are imposed.
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Figure 1: Illustration of an experimental market with ten vertically differentiated qualities
A, . . . , J . The thin green lines represent the demand and supply curves for the efficient qual-
ity D; the thin blue dashed lines represent the demand and supply curves for the inefficiently
high quality G. Each circle denotes an equilibrium price and quantity if only one quality
was available—for example, the point (34, 3496) represents the equilibrium when only the
lowest quality, A, is available. The thick black line represents a price floor of 6000—when
such a price a price floor is imposed, in any stable outcome all trade takes place at a price
of 6000 at quality G; this is represented by the disc at the intersection of the price floor and
the demand curve for quality G goods.
denoted A,B, . . . , J , where A is the lowest quality and J is the highest quality. The utility a
buyer recieves from a good is increasing in the quality of that good; however, the additional
utility a buyer recieves from an incremental increase in quality is decreasing in initial quality.
Analogously, the cost a sellers incurs from producing a good is increasing in the quality of
that good, and moreover the additional cost a seller incurs from an incremental increase in
quality is increasing in initial quality. Quality D is the quality which maximizes joint surplus,
and hence is the only quality traded in competitive equilibrium in an economy without price
controls. The markets in Series 1 were unconstrained for some experiments; later, a price
floor of 6000 was implemented. When this price floor exists, as illustrated by Figure 1,
there is no feasible price for which demand equals supply in this market. Qualities with
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equilibrium prices above the floor (i.e., G and all lower qualities) have an excess supply at
the price floor, and qualities with equilibrium prices above the floor have an excess demand
at the price floor. However, even though competitive equilibria do not exist, sellers can
compete by offering higher quality at reduced prices.
In particular, we found in the Series 1 experiments that quality does respond to price
controls and does so exactly in the manner suggested by economic intuition. Without price
controls, the prices and qualities found in the market are close to the predictions derived
from the competitive equilibrium: agents trade the unique efficient quality and the number of
trades maximizes total surplus.5 By contrast, price floors above the competitive equilibrium
price induce agents to trade higher quality goods; furthermore, overall market efficiency is
lowered by the existence of a price floor.
A close examination of the data from Series 1 revealed that the experimental outcomes
observed were well described by the f -core of a cooperative game with a continuum of unit-
demand buyers and unit-supply sellers.6,7 This was despite the fact that in the experimental
setting subjects had multi-unit demand/supply (and, furthermore, there was a small, finite
number of subjects). In order to explore the reliability of this model, a second series of
experiments was performed. In Series 2, a double auction market with three possible qual-
ities was created, in which price floors and price ceilings were strategically placed to create
different equilibria in the model under conditions for which competitive equilibria do not
exist.
Close examination of the data from Series 2 indicated that the appropriate solution
concept for predicting behavior in the presence of price controls is the notion of stability from
matching theory. That discovery compelled us to consider stability as a solution concept
5The strong convergance properties of double auction markets to competitive equilibria are well-known:
see Plott (1982) or Holt (1995) for an overview, as well as more recent work by Kirchsteiger et al. (2005)
and Crockett et al. (2011).
6The f -core is a collection of finite coalitions such that no other finite coalition can provide all members
of it with a higher payoff: see Kaneko and Wooders (1986, 1996) and Hammond et al. (1989).
7See Plott et al. (2007) for further details on this construction. The theoretical requirement of Plott et al.
(2007) that there be a continuum of agents was relaxed by Hatfield et al. (2012); however, the model of
Hatfield et al. (2012) still requires that each agent have unit-demand/supply.
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for environments with price controls in general and to our experimental environment in
particular. In particular, we develop a two-sided model of exchange with a finite number of
multi-unit demand buyers and multi-unit supply sellers, multiple qualities, and price controls;
we show that stable outcomes exist in our setting. The foundation of our model relies
heavily on Hatfield et al. (2011), who recently demonstrated that a natural correspondence
exists between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibria (in settings
without price controls).8 We extend that analysis here to show that stable outcomes always
exist in our setting, even when price restrictions are present, using techniques developed
by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Echenique and Oviedo (2006), and Hatfield and Kominers
(2011, 2012). In other words, stability is a natural generalization of competitive equilibrium,
but stable outcomes exist even when competitive equilibria do not due to price controls.
A stable outcome is simply a set of transactions that is individually rational and un-
blocked: that is, there does not exist a transaction between a buyer and a seller that both
would choose to engage in (possibly no longer executing other transactions they are a party
to). Suppose there is one unit-demand buyer who values a good at 3, and two unit-supply
sellers whose cost for producing the good is 1. In that case, the competitive equilibrium and
the stable outcome involve one of the sellers trading his good to the buyer at a price of 1. If,
however, a price floor of 2 is imposed, then no competitive equilibrium exists—both sellers
demand to sell the good at the price of 2. However, there exist two stable outcomes: in each,
one of the two sellers sells his good at a price of 2 to the buyer, and the other seller is unable
to block this transaction, as any trade must have a price of 2 or greater. Stability is related
to, but not the same as, the core: In our setting, stability provides a sharper prediction, as
the set of stable outcomes is a strict subset of the core.9 In our first series of experiments,
all trade takes place at the price floor for quality G goods in any stable outcome; this is
depicted in Figure 1, where the stable outcome is denoted with a disc at the intersection of
8See also the work by Sotomayor (2007, 2009) and Jaume et al. (2009), who demonstrate a similar corre-
spondence in two-sided settings with discrete contracts (but without price controls).
9See Hatfield et al. (2011) for further discussion of the relationship between these two solution concepts.
5
the price floor and the demand curve for quality G goods.
The discovery of an explanatory theory allowed us to make specific, nontrivial, predictions
regarding experimental outcomes and hence to directly examine the reliability of the model.
The model predicts that for price floors slightly above the competitive equilibrium price (for
the efficient quality), agents either trade the efficient quality at the price floor, or trade a
good of quality one increment higher at a price reflecting exactly the increase in a buyer’s
utility from the quality difference. However, as the price floor is raised, eventually all trade
will happen at the higher quality, and such trades of the higher quality good will be at a price
strictly above the price floor. Analogous theoretical results are obtained for price ceilings.
The outcomes observed are very close to those predicted by the theory.10 In particular, for
price floors slightly above the competitive equilibrium price, agents trade both the efficient
quality at the price floor and a higher quality in accord with the predictions of the theory.
Furthermore, the efficiency of the overall market falls within the interval predicted by the
theory. When the price floor is raised to a level where theory predicts that only the high
quality good is traded, almost all trade amongst the experimental subjects takes place at
that quality, and does so at the price suggested by the theory; the efficiency of the overall
market was within 8% of the predicted value. Experiments were also performed with price
ceilings with very similar results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
characterizes the set of competitive equilibria and the set of stable outcomes. Section 3
describes the experimental procedure and parameters, and Section 4 then uses these param-
eters and the theory to make specific predictions of equilibrium behavior. Section 5 then
compares these predictions to the experimental results. We conclude in Section 6. All proofs
are in Appendix A.
10Our theory also makes accurate predictions for the equilibrium behavior of experimental subjects in
Isaac and Plott (1981), which considers buyer-seller markets with price controls (but only one quality).
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2 The Quality Competition Model
2.1 Framework
There is a finite set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S. Any given buyer and seller can
make a trade ω that denotes a buyer b(ω) ∈ B, a seller s(ω) ∈ S, and a quality q(ω) ∈ Q,
where Q is defined as a set of consecutive integers {qmin, . . . , qmax}. If one seller sells multiple
units of the same quality good to a buyer, this relationship will be represented by multiple
trades. The finite set of trades is given by Ω. For a given set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω, let Ψb be the
set of trades in Ψ associated with buyer b, i.e., Ψb ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : b(ω) = b}, and similarly let
Ψs ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : s(ω) = s}.
We can define transactions in terms of contracts. A contract (ω, pω) is a trade along
with an associated transfer price; the set of contracts is given by X ≡ Ω × R. For a
contract x = (ω, pω), we let b(x) ≡ b(ω), s(x) ≡ s(ω), q(x) ≡ q(ω), and p(x) ≡ pω.
We also define b(Y ) ≡ ⋃x∈Y b(x) and s(Y ) ≡ ⋃x∈Y s(x). Finally, we let Yb be the set of
contracts in Y associated with buyer b, i.e., Yb ≡ {x ∈ X : b(x) = b}, and similarly let
Ys ≡ {x ∈ Y : s(x) = s}; we let the set of all agents associated with some contract in Y be
denoted as a(Y ) ≡ b(Y ) ∪ s(Y ).
We also define a price vector p ∈ RΩ which states a price pω for each ω ∈ Ω. An
arrangement [Ψ; p] is a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω and a price vector p ∈ RΩ.
A set of contracts Y ⊆ X is an outcome if it is feasible, that is no two contracts refer
to the same trade: if (ω, pω), (ω, p˜ω) ∈ Y , then (ω, pω) = (ω, p˜ω). Note that in contrast to
arrangements, an outcome Y only describes prices for those trades that are part of contracts
in Y . Let
τ(Y ) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : (ω, pω) ∈ Y for some pω ∈ R},
the set of trades associated with contracts in Y . For an arrangement [Ψ; p], let
κ([Ψ; p]) ≡ {(ω, p˜ω) ∈ X : ω ∈ Ω and p˜ω = pω},
be the set of contracts that execute the trades Ψ at prices p in the arrangement [Ψ; p].
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2.1.1 Preferences
The valuation function ub of buyer b ∈ B for a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is given by
ub(Ψ) ≡ f b(|Ψb|) +
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω))
where f b(n) is the value b obtains from procuring n goods and v(q) is the additional utility
b obtains from procuring a good of quality q. Let f b be strictly increasing and concave, and
let v be strictly concave.
The valuation function of seller s ∈ S for a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is given by
us(Ψ) ≡ −cs(|Ψs|)−
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω))
where cs is the cost s incurs from producing n goods and e(q) is the additional cost s incurs
from producing a good of quality q. Let cs be strictly increasing and convex, and let e be
strictly convex.11
For ease of exposition, we assume that there is a unique quality qˆ that maximizes surplus,
i.e.,
{qˆ} ≡ arg max
q∈Q
v(q) + e(q),
and furthermore that qˆ is neither the highest nor lowest quality, i.e., qmin < qˆ < qmax.
The utility functions of a buyer b ∈ B and a seller s ∈ S for an outcome Y ⊆ X are
given by
U b(Y ) ≡ ub(τ(Y ))−
∑
y∈Y
p(y),
U s(Y ) ≡ us(τ(Y )) +
∑
y∈Y
p(y).
For an arrangement [Ψ; p], we let U i([Ψ; p]) ≡ U i(κ([Ψ; p])) for all i ∈ B ∪ S.
11This characterization of buyer and seller’s utility functions is equivalent to the cardinality condition of
Bevia et al. (1999). These assumptions on preferences and agents are more restrictive assumptions than is
necessary for some of our results; however, these assumptions closely parallel our experimental design. For
a more general model (without price restrictions), see Hatfield et al. (2011).
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Using these utility functions we define the demand correspondence for i ∈ B ∪ S given a
price vector p ∈ R|Ω| as
Di(p) ≡ arg max
Ψ⊆Ωi
U i([Ψ; p]).
Similarly, we define the choice correspondence from a finite set of contracts Y ⊆ X as
Ci(Y ) ≡ arg max
Z⊆Yi
U i(Z)
2.1.2 Definition of Equilibrium
We now define two distinct notions of equilibrium, competitive equilibrium and stability.
Definition. A competitive equilibrium is an arrangement [Ψ; p] such that
Ψi ∈ Di(p)
for all i ∈ B ∪ S.
This definition encodes both individual optimization (as each agent demands an optimal
set of trades, given prices) and market clearing (as a buyer demands an object from a seller
at a given price if and only if the seller is willing to sell him that item).
We now define stability:
Definition. An outcome A ⊆ X is stable if it is
1. Individually rational : for all i ∈ B ∪ S, A ∈ Ci(A).
2. Unblocked : there does not exist a nonempty blocking set Z ⊆ X such that
(a) Z ∩ A = ∅, and
(b) for all i ∈ a(Z), we have that Zi ⊆ Y i for all Y i ∈ Ci(Z ∪ A).
The first condition, individual rationality, states that no agent is strictly better off by
choosing a strict subset of his contracts in A. The second condition states that there does
not exist a set of contracts Z such that all the agents involved in Z would strictly prefer to
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sign all of them (and possibly drop some of their existing contracts in A) to sticking with
their contracts in A.
Note that a blocking set may be of any size and involve an arbitrary number of agents.
However, in the context of our quality competition model, for any blocking set Z, the set
{z} ⊆ Z is also a blocking set. In other words, for any blocking set, any contract within
that blocking set is a blocking set in and of itself. Hence, while an outcome is stable only if
there does not exist a blocking set, for any outcome that is not stable, the outcome is either
not individually rational or there exists a blocking set containing one contract.
The notion of stability is also closely related to the core, defined below:
Definition. An outcome A is in the core if it is core unblocked, i.e., there does not exist a
set of contracts Z such that, for all i ∈ a(Z), U i(Z) > U i(A).
An outcome is in the core if there does not exist a set of agents who, by dropping all
of their current contracts and signing contracts only amongst themselves can make each of
them strictly better off. The definition of the core differs from the definition of stability in
two ways. First, a core block requires that all agents who are associated with the blocking
set drop all of their contracts with agents not associated with the blocking set; this is a
more stringent restriction than that imposed by stability, where agents associated with the
blocking set may retain previously held contracts. Second, a core block does not require
that Zi ∈ Ci(Z ∪ A) for all i ∈ a(Z); rather, it requires the less stringent condition that
U i(Z) > U i(A) for all i ∈ a(Z).
However, when preferences are substitutable, as is the case here, the set of competitive
equilibria, the set of stable outcomes, and the core are all closely related.
Theorem 1. For any competitive equilibrium [Ψ; p], κ([Ψ; p]) is a stable outcome; further-
more, any stable outcome is in the core. Conversely, for any core outcome A, there exists a
stable outcome Aˆ such that τ(A) = τ(Aˆ).
This theorem shows that when competitive equilibria exist, they induce stable outcomes.
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In fact, when no price restrictions are present, a converse result holds as well: all stable
outcomes induce competitive equilibria.12 However, when price restrictions are present,
competitive equilibria may not exist, and so stable outcomes do not, in general, induce
competitive equilibria.
While the core is a natural solution concept in this setting, it does not make specific pre-
dictions about prices, as if a buyer and seller may engage in multiple trades with each other,
those trades can be at prices that are not supportable in a stable outcome or competitive
equilibrium. Furthermore, the set of realizable utility outcomes is strictly larger for the set
of core outcomes than for the set of stable outcomes. For instance, suppose there is only one
buyer b, one seller s, a set of trades Ω = {ψ, ω}, and let
ub(Ψ) = 4|Ψ|
us(Ψ) = −3 max{0, |Ψ| − 1};
the buyer has constant marginal utility from each item, while the seller only incurs a cost if
he sells both items. Then {(ψ, 2), (ω, 2)} is a core outcome, but it is not stable (and does not
induce a competitive equilibrium). In particular, the seller will obtain a utility of at least 3
in any stable outcome, but only receives a utility of only 1 in this core outcome.13
2.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
Before we fully characterize the set of stable outcomes, it will be helpful to consider the case
where there are no price restrictions and the set of trades is restricted to one quality. Let
Ω(q¯) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : q(ω) = q¯} and let X(q¯) ≡ Ω(q¯)× R.
12Formally, when we say that stable outcome induces a competitive equilibrium, we mean that for a stable
outcome A, there exists a price vector p˜ ∈ RΩ such that [τ(A); p˜] is a competitive equilibrium such that if
(ω, pω) ∈ A, then p˜ω = pω. See Hatfield et al. (2011) for a proof and discussion of this result.
13Note that this phenomenon is only present if both buyers and sellers may demand multiple contracts. If
agents on one side of the market demand at most one contract, then the core and the set of stable outcomes
coincide; see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Furthermore, this phenomenon is present only when there are a
finite number of buyers and sellers or indivisible goods; for economies with a continuum of agents and divisible
goods, the set of competitive equilibria allocations again coincides with the core; see Hammond et al. (1989).
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Theorem 2. Suppose there are no price restrictions, and the set of contracts is given by
X(q¯). Then a stable outcome exists, and for any stable outcome A:
1. The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f(nb) + v(q¯)]−
∑
s∈S
[c(ns) + e(q¯)]
}
where ∑
b∈B
nb =
∑
s∈S
ns = n.
2. For all (ω, pω) ∈ A, pω ∈ [pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)], where
pmin(q¯) ≡ max
b∈B,s∈S
{f b(|Ab|+ 1)− f b(|Ab|) + v(q¯), cs(|As|)− cs(|As| − 1) + e(q¯)}
pmax(q¯) ≡ min
b∈B,s∈S
{f b(|Ab|)− f b(|Ab| − 1) + v(q¯), cs(|As|+ 1)− cs(|As|) + e(q¯)}
The theorem makes two specific predictions about behavior when only one quality is
available. First, the theorem predicts that a surplus-maximizing number of trades will take
place. Second, the theorem predicts that all trades will take place at a price in the interval
[pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)]. The lower bound of this interval is the minimal price such that no buyer
wishes to buy one more unit and every seller wishes to sell his prescribed number of units.
Conversely, the upper bound of this interval is the maximal price such that every buyer
wishes to buy his prescribed number of units, and no seller wishes to sell one more unit.
2.2.1 Without Price Restrictions
When no price restrictions are present the set of stable outcomes is as in Theorem 2 where
the one quality present is the efficient quality qˆ.
Theorem 3. Suppose there are no price restrictions. A stable outcome exists, and for any
stable outcome A, A is efficient and:
1. For all ψ ∈ τ(A), q(ψ) = qˆ.
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2. The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f(nb) + v(qˆ)]−
∑
s∈S
[c(ns) + e(qˆ)]
}
where ∑
b∈B
nb =
∑
s∈S
ns = n.
3. For all (ω, pω) ∈ A, pω ∈ [pmin(qˆ), pmax(qˆ)]
The theorem makes three specific predictions. First, the theorem predicts that all trade
will take place at the efficient quality qˆ. Second, the theorem predicts that a surplus-
maximizing number of trades will take place, given that quality. Finally, the theorem predicts
that all trades will take place at prices in the interval [pmin(qˆ), pmax(qˆ)]: The lower bound is
high enough such that no buyer wishes to buy an additional item, and every seller receives
nonnegative surplus from each item he sells, and, conversely, the higher bound is low enough
such that every buyer receives nonnegative surplus from each item he buys, and no seller
wishes to sell an additional item.
2.2.2 With Price Restrictions
We now consider the case where there is a price floor pf . In characterizing the set of stable
outcomes, there are essentially three cases to consider, as exemplified in Figure 2. The first
is that the price floor does not bind, i.e., pf < p
min(qˆ). In this case, the price floor has no
effect on the market, as the buyer and seller can always renegotiate to the efficient quality
in a contract that makes both parties better off.
In the second case, the price floor is above pmax(q) for some q ≥ qˆ, and below pmin(q+1)−
[v(q+ 1)− v(q)]; this is the case where the price floor lies above the lower set of dashed lines
but below the dotted lines in Figure 2. In that case, there may be trade at both the quality
q and q+ 1. The price of the higher quality good must be greater than the price of the lower
quality good by exactly the difference in the buyers’ valuation of the qualities; otherwise, a
buyer who is worse off given the current prices and the quality he is trading at will offer a
13
Quantity
Price
Figure 2: Illustration of the experimental market with two vertically differentiated qualities.
The green lines represent the demand and supply curves for the efficient low quality; the
blue lines represent the demand and supply curves for the inefficiently high quality. The
dashed lines denote pmin(q) and pmax(q) for each quality q. The dotted black lines represent
pmin(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] and pmax(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)]. When the price floor is
below the lower set of dashed lines, Case 1 of Theorem 4 applies. When the price floor is
above the lower set of dashed lines but below the dotted lines, Case 2 of Theorem 4 applies.
Finally, when the price floor is above the dotted lines but below the higher set of dashed
lines, Case 3 of Theorem 4 applies.
slightly higher price to a seller currently trading at the other quality. Furthermore, the lower
price must be at the price floor, as otherwise sellers of the (inefficiently) high quality good
would offer a buyer of the lower quality good the same good at a slightly lower price and
gain the efficiency surplus. However, when the prices differ by this exact amount, and the
lower quality good trades at the price floor, both qualites can trade in positive quantities as
part of a stable outcome. In this stable outcome, none of the sellers who are not currently
trading can make a positive profit by offering the higher quality good at a lower price, and
these sellers also can not offer the lower quality good at a lower price, as it is trading at the
price floor.
In the third case, the price floor is such that pf +[v(q+1)−v(q)] > pmax(q+1) holds; this
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is the case where the price floor lies above the dotted lines in Figure 2. In this case, it will
no longer be possible to sell the quality q good, since there will be sellers without a current
trading partner willing to trade the quality q+ 1 good at a price that makes it attractive to
current buyers of the quality q good. In that case, trade will be limited to only quality q+ 1
goods, so long as the price floor remains below pmin(q + 1); hence, the stable outcome will
be as if trade at only quality q + 1 was available. Note that, in this case, the price floor pf
affects the outcome even though no trade occurs at pf .
We formalize this discussion below.
Theorem 4. Consider a price floor pf . A stable outcome exists. There are three cases:
1. pf < p
min(qˆ): Then any stable outcome is as in Theorem 3.
2. pmax(q) < pf < p
min(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] for some q ≥ qˆ: Then in any stable
outcome A,
(a) For any contract x ∈ A, we have that either
i. q(x) = q and p(x) = pf , or
ii. q(x) = q + 1, and p(x) = pf + [v(q + 1)− v(q)].
(b) The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f b(nb) + v(q)− pf ]
}
where ∑
b∈B
nb = n.
3. pmax(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] < pf < pmin(q + 1) for some q ≥ qˆ: Then any stable
outcome is as in Theorem 2 with quality q + 1.
Imposing a price floor induces three separate forms of inefficiency. First, some agents may
contract at an inefficient quality. Second, some agents may not contract at all, even though
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there exist surplus-increasing trades; for a contract to increase the welfare of both parties,
it must have a price below the price floor. Finally, the wrong agents may contract—that
is, in case 2 of Theorem 4, there may be sellers who would like to contract with a buyer at
the price floor, and in fact have a lower marginal cost of production than a current seller;
however, they can not undercut that current seller due to the price floor.
We now consider the case where there is a price ceiling, which is analogous to the case
of a price floor, except that the roles of buyers and sellers are reversed.
Theorem 5. Consider a price ceiling pc. A stable outcome exists. There are three cases:
1. pc > p
max(qˆ): Then any stable outcome is as in Theorem 3.
2. pmin(q) > pc > p
max(q − 1) + [e(q) − e(q − 1)] for some q ≤ qˆ: Then in any stable
outcome A,
(a) For any contract x ∈ A, either
i. q(x) = q and p(x) = pc, or
ii. q(x) = q − 1 and p(x) = pc − [e(q)− e(q − 1)].
(b) The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
s∈S
[pc − c(nb)− e(q)]
}
where ∑
s∈S
ns = n.
3. pmin(q − 1) + [e(q) − e(q − 1)] > pc > pmax(q − 1) for some q ≤ qˆ: Then any stable
outcome is as in Theorem 2 with quality q − 1.
3 Experimental Series and Markets
The general structure of the experiments is contained in Table 1. A total of nine experi-
ments were conducted. Each experiment consisted of 7-8 buyers and 7-8 sellers. Subjects
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were undergraduate students at the California Institute of Technology who had previous
experience in participating in computerized double auction markets. Subjects were located
in the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science and each ex-
periment lasted about three hours. A subject was randomly assigned to be either a seller
or a buyer upon arrival. Subjects were then given instructional sheets, record sheets, and
payoff tables that described his or her own redemption values or costs.
All markets were conducted through Caltech’s electronic market system, Marketscape.
This program supports multiple markets through a double auction system with an open
book. Goods of varying quality may be traded, and the order book for each good is visible
to all of the participants. The best buy offers and the best sell offers in all markets are public
on a single screen as are the prices of the last contracts accepted in each of the markets. The
system operates in a sequence of periods. Each period is of fixed length and a countdown
clock shows the number of seconds left in a period. Buyers are free to submit orders to buy
at a price and quantity, which are entered into the book, where they remain until traded or
cancelled. Similarly, sellers submit sell orders of a price and quantity, which are entered into
the sell order book. A buyer sees a list of the sell orders listed from the lowest price to the
highest for each quality market on his/her screen, and a seller sees a corresponding list of
the buy offers listed from the highest price to the lowest for each quality market on his/her
screen. These books are updated in real time as new orders are submitted. A trade takes
place when a buyer or seller submits an order that “crosses” an offer of a counterparty.
When a period closes, a buyer’s earnings for that period are the total value of all goods
purchased minus the sum of the purchase prices. A seller’s earnings are the sum of the prices
for items he sold minus the costs of production.
Each period is independent: purchases and sales in a prior period have no effect on
another period’s payoffs. The subject has the opportunity to record and study profits for
the period and the profitability of previous periods. The number of periods is unknown to
the subjects.
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There were four types of buyers and four types of sellers in each session. The redemption
values and costs differed across different types. The information of each individual was
limited to information about his or her own payoff. They were not aware of the existence
of different types or the costs, payoffs, or conversion rates of others. The instruction sheet
can be found in Appendix B. The type of currency used in the experiments was francs. The
conversion rate differed across subjects, depending on their types. Before each experiment
started, a trial period was conducted to familiarize subjects with the procedure. Each
individual maintained his or her own record of activities and earnings but the records were
also maintained in the computer and were available to individual subjects at the end of
each period. During a period the computer maintained a real time record of purchases and
earnings, together with a time series of prices in each market.
3.1 Experimental Markets
There were two series of experimental markets. Series 1 is based on ten different qualities
of the good, called A,B, . . . , J . A is the the lowest quality (i.e. the quality with the lowest
value to the buyer and the lowest cost to produce for the seller), and J is the highest quality.
We conducted five sessions in Series 1. We did not impose any price controls for the first two
sessions (1.1 and 1.2). In the last three sessions (1.3-5), we imposed a price floor of 6000,
which is above pmax(G). In sessions 1.4 and 1.5, we removed the price floor in later periods
to see if the market adjusts to the competitive equilibrium.
In Series 2, there are three qualities, A, B, and C in the experimental market. We
conducted four sessions for Series 2. In sessions 2.1 and 2.2, we imposed price floors of
1312 and 1470, respectively. These sessions correspond to the second and third cases of
Theorem 4, respectively. In sessions 2.3 and 2.4, we imposed price ceilings of 1088 and 930,
which correspond to the second and third cases of Theorem 5, respectively. In session 2.2, we
removed the price floor in the last 3 periods to see if the market adjusted to the competitive
equilibrium. The experimental conditions are summarized in Table 1.
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3.2 Preferences and Incentive Procedures
3.2.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Buyers (sellers) were given tables stating their valuations (costs) of obtaining (producing) a
good depending on the good’s quality and how many goods had already been bought (sold)
by that agent. Table 2 shows the values given to a Type 1 buyer. For a buyer b of type k,
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of b is given by
ub(|Ψ|) = ((6438− 150k)− 300|Ψb|)|Ψb|+
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω)),
where the utility v(q) obtained from a quality q good is given by
v(A) = 0, v(B) = 692 v(C) = 1250
v(D) = 1686 v(E) = 2012 v(F ) = 2240
v(G) = 2382 v(H) = 2450 v(I) = 2456
v(J) = 2412.
Table 2 also shows the costs given to a Type 1 seller. For a seller s of type k, where
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of s is given by
us(|Ψ|) = −((3398 + 5k) + 10|Ψs|)|Ψs| −
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω)),
where the disutility e(q) from producing a quality q good is given by
e(A) = 0 e(B) = 277 e(C) = 600
e(D) = 964 e(E) = 1368 e(F ) = 1807
e(G) = 2280 e(H) = 2782 e(I) = 3312
e(J) = 3865.
Notice the marginal utility from an additional unit depends only on the number of units
the buyer (seller) has already consumed (produced), not on the characteristics or combination
of units the buyer (seller) has already consumed (produced). This ensures that the marginal
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valuation of an additional unit is independent of the composition of the commodities the
subject has already purchased or sold.
3.2.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
In Series 2, there were three qualities of goods, A, B, and C. Similar to Series 1, subjects
were given tables stating their valuations and costs. Table 3 shows the values given to a
Type 1 buyer. For a buyer b of type k, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of b is
given by
ub(|Ψ|) = ((1690− 45k)− 90|Ψb|)|Ψb|+
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω)),
where the utility v(q) obtained from a quality q good is given by
v(A) = 0 v(B) = 600 v(C) = 800.
Note that, as in Series 1, the marginal utility of an additional good only depends on that
good’s quality and on the number of goods the agent has already bought, not the quality of
the goods the agent has already bought.
Table 3 also shows the costs given to a Type 1 seller in Series 2. For a seller s of type k,
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of s is given by
us(|Ψ|) = −((−90 + 45k) + 90|Ψs|)|Ψs| −
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω)),
where the cost e(q) from producing a quality q good is given by
e(A) = 0 e(B) = 200 e(C) = 800.
Note that, as in Series 1, the marginal disutility of an additional good only depends on that
good’s quality and on the number of goods the agent has already sold, not the quality of the
goods the agent has already sold.
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4 Predictions
4.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Experiments based on Series 1 parameters had ten qualities, as described in the introduction
and depicted in Figure 1. The quality D is the most efficient. With no price controls, in any
stable outcome (or competitive equilibrium) with 8 sellers and 8 buyers, 44 units of quality
D are traded at a price in the interval [4482, 4487].14 When there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers,
total surplus from trade is 73458 in any stable outcome.15
For sessions 1.3-5 a price floor of 6000 was imposed. The price interval for quality G
is [pmin(G), pmax(G)] = [5778, 5783]; the price interval for quality H is [pmin(H), pmax(H)] =
[6265, 6270]. The marginal value to the buyer of an increase in quality from G to H is 68.
Hence the set of stable outcomes is characterized by case 2 of Theorem 4. The theorem
predicts that 32 units of either quality G or H will be traded, with the price of G being 6000
and the price of H being 6068. However, the minimum cost to produce good H is 6195,
which is greater than 6068, and so it is expected that all trade will be of quality G goods at
the price floor of 6000; this outcome is represented by the intersection of the price floor and
the demand curve for quality G goods in Figure 1.16 When there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers,
total surplus from trade is 48464 in any stable outcome.17
4.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
Experiments based on Series 2 parameters had three qualities. The “middle” quality B is the
most efficient. With no price controls, in any stable outcome (or competitive equilibrium)
14In experiments 1.2 and 1.3, we had 8 sellers and 7 buyers. In these experiments, 39 units of quality D
are traded at 4472 francs in any stable outcome. In experiment 1.5, we had 7 sellers and 7 buyers. In this
experiment, 39 units of quality D are traded at a price in the interval [4482, 4487] in any stable outcome.
15When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, total surplus is 65728 in any stable outcome. When there are 7
sellers and 7 buyers, total surplus is 65498 in any stable outcome.
16When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.3, 28 units of G should be traded in any stable
outcome. When there are 7 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.5, 28 units of G should be traded in any
stable outcome.
17When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.3, total surplus is 43446 in any stable outcome.
When there are 7 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.5, total surplus is 43336 in any stable outcome.
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with 8 sellers and 8 buyers, 44 units of quality B are traded at a price in the interval
[1190, 1210]. Total market surplus is 42460 in any stable outcome.
Quantity
1200
1600
1312
1512
Price
(a) pf = 1312.
Quantity
1200
1600
1470
Price
(b) pf = 1470.
Figure 3: In each subfigure, the green lines denote the supply and demand for the efficient
quality B, while the blue lines denote the supply and demand for the inefficiently high quality
C; the dashed lines at 1190 and 1210 denote pmin(B) and pmax(B), while the dashed lines at
1590 and 1610 denote pmin(C) and pmax(C). In Fig. 3(a), the black line at 1312 denotes the
price floor at which quality B goods trade, while the dashed line at 1512 denotes the price
at which quality C goods trade. In Fig. 3(b), the black line at 1470 denotes the price floor;
in this case, only quality C goods trade, and do so at a price in the interval [1590, 1610].
In session 2.1, a price floor pf = 1312 was introduced, as depicted in Fig. 3(a); this price
floor is above the equilibrium price interval for the efficient quality B. The stable outcome
induced by this price floor is described in case 2 of Theorem 4, since
1312 = pf < p
min(C)− [v(C)− v(B)] = 1390.
Hence, from Theorem 4, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will trade at the
price floor of 1312, while quality C will trade at 1512, the price floor plus the value to the
buyer of an increase in quality from B to C. The total quantity traded will be 38 units when
there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers present. Total market surplus is in the interval [28200, 41800]
in any stable outcome.
In session 2.2, a price floor pf = 1470 was introduced, as depicted in Fig. 3(b). The
stable outcome induced by this price floor is described in case 3 of Theorem 4, since
1470 = pf > p
max(C)− [v(C)− v(B)] = 1410.
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Hence, from Theorem 4, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will not be traded,
while quality C will trade in the interval [1590, 1610]. The total quantity traded will be 34
units, and total market surplus is 26860 in any stable outcome; this outcome is depicted as
the crossing of the supply and demand curves for quality C in Fig. 3(b).
Quantity
1200
800
1088
888
Price
(a) pf = 1312.
Quantity
1200
800
930
Price
(b) pf = 1470.
Figure 4: In each subfigure, the green lines denote the supply and demand for the efficient
quality B, while the red lines denote the supply and demand for the inefficiently low quality
A; the dashed lines at 1190 and 1210 denote pmin(B) and pmax(B), while the dashed lines at
790 and 880 denote pmin(A) and pmax(A). In Fig. 4(a), the black line at 1088 denotes the
price ceiling at which quality B goods trade, while the dashed line at 88 denotes the price
at which quality A goods trade. In Fig. 4(b), the black line at 930 denotes the price floor;
in this case, only quality A goods trade, and do so at a price in the interval [790, 810].
Analogous arguments apply to the case of price ceilings. In session 2.3, a price ceiling
pc = 1088 was imposed, as depicted in Fig. 4(a); this price floor is below the equilibrium
price interval for the efficient quality B. The stable outcome induced by this price floor is
described in case 2 of Theorem 5, since
1088 = pc > p
max(A) + [e(B)− e(A)] = 1010.
Hence, from Theorem 5, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will trade at the
price ceiling of 1088, while quality A will trade at 888, the price ceiling minus the extra cost
to the seller of an increase in quality from A to B. The total quantity traded will be 38
units, and the total market surplus is in the interval [28200, 41800] in any stable outcome.
In session 2.4, a price ceiling of pc = 930 was introduced, as depicted in Fig. 4(b). The
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stable outcome induced by this price ceiling is described in case 3 of Theorem 5, since
930 = pc < p
min(A) + [e(B)− e(A)] = 990.
Hence, from Theorem 5, in any stable outcome, the quality B will not be traded, while
quality A will trade in the interval [790, 810]. The total quantity traded will be 34 units,
and the total market surplus is 24860 in any stable outcome with 8 sellers and 8 buyers;
this outcome is depicted as the crossing of the supply and demand curves for quality C in
Fig. 3(b). Note that in session 2.4 there were only 7 buyers and 7 sellers. The theoretical
predictions of the trading price remain the same but the stable outcome now entails only 30
units of quality A being traded. The total market surplus is 24060 in any stable outcome
with 7 sellers and 7 buyers.
A summary of all predictions is given in the table below.
Table: Theoretical predictions (8 sellers and 8 buyers)
Quality Quantity Price Total surplus
Series 1
No price control D 44 [4482, 4487] 73458
Price floor 6000 G 32 6000 48464
Series 2
No price control B 44 [1190, 1210] 42460
Price floor 1312 B and C 38 1312(B), 1512(C) [28200, 41800]
Price floor 1470 C 34 [1590, 1610] 26860
Price ceiling 1088 A and B 38 888(A), 1088(B) [28200, 41800]
Price ceiling 930 A 34 [790, 810] 26860
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5 Results
5.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Our first result shows that in the sessions with ten qualities and no price restrictions play
converged to a stable outcome. This series is important as general equilibrium experiments
with multiple qualities have not been conducted heretofore.
Result 1. In the absence of any price restrictions for the Series 1 market, the number of
goods traded, the equilibrium price of the efficient quality, and the market efficiency all
converge to competitive equilibrium/stable outcome values.
Table 4 shows market efficiency in each period for each session in Series 1. When no
price restrictions are imposed, the average efficiency is over 90% for all sessions, except for
session 1.2 in which there are only three periods. However, the market efficiency reaches
95.2% in the third period in this session. Efficiency also tends to rise in the later periods
of session 1.1. The average number of units traded by period, 42.5, is also very close to the
theoretical prediction of the competitive equilibrium, 44.
Table 5 summarizes the proportion of trade by quality during the second half of periods
5-7 in session 1.1. 62.1% of trades are for quality D goods while, in any stable outcome or
competitive equilibrium, we expect 100% of trades to take place for qualityD goods; however,
the proportion of goods traded at quality D does clearly rise thoughout the experiments.
Prices for quality D goods are very close to competitive equilibrium prices. The average
traded price in for quality D goods is 4503.7 during the second half of Periods 5-7 in session
1.1, while the range of competitive equilibrium prices is [4482, 4487]; the difference between
the average traded price and the theoretical prediction is 0.3%.
Statistical testing of static equilibrium models is enhanced by the use of the time series
of the price discovery process. Following the methodology of Noussair et al. (1995, 1997)
and Myagkov and Plott (1997), we estimate the Ashenfelter/El-Gamal model of market
convergence for our data. This model assumes that the average price for each experiment
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may start from a different origin but all markets will experience adjustment, as described by
a common functional form, and converge to a common aysymptotic value.
The parameter of interest for the Series 1 experiments when no price control is imposed
is the equilibrium price of quality D. Hence, we estimate
p¯ti(D)−
pminD + pmax(D)
2
= β1d1
1
t
+ β2d2
1
t
+ β4d4
1
t
+ γ(1− 1
t
) + uti
where i indicates the particular experiment, and t represents time as measured by the number
of market periods in the experiment. We let p¯ti(D) denote the mean traded price in period t;
recall that the theoretical prediction is that the price lies in the interval [pmin(D), pmax(D)].
We let di be a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the experiment i, and 0 otherwise;
we do not use the data from Session 1.5 because there are only two periods in which a price
control was not imposed. For session 1.4, we use data only from periods 4 to 7, i.e. those
periods in which a price control was not imposed. The parameter βi represents the the origin
of a possible convergence process for session i. The paramter γ represents the asymptotic
difference between the common asymptotic value and the theoretical prediction; hence, γ
will be close to 0 if the difference between the traded prices and the theoretical prediction
approaches 0 toward the end of each experiment. The random error term uti is distributed
normally with mean zero.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. The estimated coefficient of γ is not significantly
different from 0, indicating that the traded prices of quality D are not significantly different
from the midpoint of the theoretical prediction near the end of the experimental sessions.
Result 2. When a price floor of 6000 is imposed for the Series 1 market, the quality of goods
traded, the traded prices, the number of goods traded, and the market efficiency converge
to stable outcome values.
Table 4 shows that when the price floor of 6000 is imposed, the average market efficiency
converges to the efficiency predicted by the theory. In the stable outcome, 66% of the possible
efficiency gains are realized, while the average market efficiency in the experimental sessions
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Figure 5: Experimental data for session 2.1 when a price floor of 1312, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The blue diamonds denote trades of the high quality good (quality
C), the green circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and red crosses trades
of the low quality good (quality A). The thin blue line at 1512 denotes the predicted price
of trades with high quality goods. The experiment took place over 9 periods, delineated by
the vertical dashed gray lines.
was 62.4%. Table 5 shows that 83.6% percent of trades are for quality G goods during the
second half of periods 5-8 of session 1.3 and periods 5-6 of session 1.5. All traded prices
were 6000 during these periods, obviating the need for statistical analysis, as the theoretical
prediction matched the experimental outcome exactly. The average number of trades per
period was also very close to the stable outcome values for each session, as shown in Table 4.
5.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
Result 3. When a price floor of 1312 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the traded prices,
the number of goods traded, the quality of goods traded, and the market efficiency converge
to stable outcome values.
Table 7 shows the market efficiency in all periods in session 2.1 in which a price floor
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of 1312 was imposed. Market efficiency is within the theoretical prediction, the interval of
[0.664, 0.984], in all periods. The average number of units traded is 41.4, which is within
8.9% of the theoretical prediction of 38. Table 8 summarizes the proportion of trade by
quality during the second half of all periods. 98.4% percent of trades took place either at
quality B or C, as predicted by the theory.
Figure 5 shows traded prices in session 2.1. Quality B goods are often traded at the price
floor of 1312. In the last 2 periods, all trades were made at the price floor of 1312 in quality
B, as the theory predicts. The average traded price for quality C in the last two periods is
1490, which is slightly below the theoretical prediction of 1512.
Result 4. When a price floor of 1470 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the number of
goods traded, the quality of goods traded, the equilibrium prices, and the market efficiency
all converge to stable outcome values.
Table 7 shows the market efficiency in all periods in session 2.2 in which a price floor
of 1470 was imposed. The average market efficiency is 69.3%, which is slightly higher than
the theoretical prediction of 63.3%. The average number of units traded is 35.5, which is
very close to the theoretical prediction of 34. Table 8 summarizes the proportion of trade
by quality during the second half of all periods. 93.1% of trades were for quality C goods,
largely in agreement with the theoretical prediction that all trade will take place at that
quality.
Figure 6 shows prices for each transaction in session 2.2; prices for quality C goods are
very close to the theoretical prediction. The average price is 1589 for a quality C good
during the last two periods of the session when the price floor was imposed, compared to a
theoretical prediction of [1590, 1610].
Figure 6 also shows how quickly the market adjusts to the competitive equilibrium. As
soon as the price floor is removed, trade shifts from quality C goods to quality B goods, and
quality B goods are traded at the prices suggested by theory. Furthermore, efficiency rose
to nearly 100%. The average trading price for quality B is 1192 during the last two periods,
28
× ×
× ×
× ×
××
××
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
Time
1470
1200
1600
Price
Figure 6: Experimental data for session 2.2 when a price floor of 1470, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The blue diamonds denote trades of the high quality good (quality
C), the green circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and red crosses trades
of the low quality good (quality A). The thin blue lines at 1590 and 1610 denote the range of
predicted prices of trades with high quality goods. The experiment took place over 7 periods,
delineated by the vertical dashed gray lines. The price floor was removed after Period 4.
which falls with the theoretically predicted interval of [1190, 1210].
Result 5. When a price ceiling of 1088 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the number of
goods traded, the quality of goods traded, the equilibrium prices, and the market efficiency
all converge to stable outcome values.
Table 7 shows the market efficiency in all periods in session 2.3 in which a price ceiling
of 1088 was imposed. Market efficiency is within the theoretical prediction, the interval of
[0.664, 0.984], in all periods. The average number of trades in a period is 43.6, which is
higher than the theoretical prediction of 38. However, the average number of trades is 40.5
for the last two periods, within 7% of the theoretical prediction. Table 8 summarizes the
proportion of trades by quality during the second half of all periods. 98.2% of trades took
place at quality A or B, as predicted by the theory.
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Figure 7: Experimental data for session 2.3 when a price ceiling of 1088, denoted by the
thick gray line, was imposed. The blue diamonds denote trades of the high quality good
(quality C), the green circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and red crosses
trades of the low quality good (quality A). The thin red line at 888 denotes the predicted
prices of trades of quality A goods.
Figure 7 shows prices for each transaction in session 2.3. The average prices for both
quality A and B goods are very close to the theoretical prediction. The average traded
price of Quality A in the last two periods is 884, which is not significantly different from the
theoretical prediction of 888, and the average price for quality B goods is 1088 in the last
two periods, which is exactly the same as the theoretical prediction.
Result 6. When a price ceiling of 930 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the number of
goods traded, the quality of goods traded, the equilibrium prices, and the market efficiency
all converge to stable outcome values.
Table 7 shows market efficiency in all periods in session 2.4 in which a price ceiling of
930 was imposed. The average market efficiency across periods was 69%, which is slightly
higher than the theoretical prediction of 63.5%. The average number of trades is 31.5, which
is also only slightly higher than the theoretical prediction of 30. Table 8 summarizes the
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Figure 8: Experimental data for session 2.4 when a price ceiling of 930, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The green circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B),
and red crosses trades of the low quality good (quality A). The thin red lines at 790 and
810 denote the range of predicted prices of trades of low quality goods.
proportion of trade by quality during the second half of all periods. 97.5% of trades were
for quality A goods, largely in agreement with the theoretical prediction that all trade will
take place at that quality.
Figure 8 shows prices for each transaction in session 2.4. Prices for quality A goods are
concentrated within the range of the theoretical prediction during the last three periods.
The average price during the last two periods is 795 for quality A goods, which is within the
range of the theoretical prediction of [790, 810].
We also estimate the Ashenfelter/El-Gamal model of market convergence for Series 2.
We first consider price controls that result in outcomes described in the second part of
Theorems 4 and 5. Hence, we estimate the difference between the traded price and the
theoretical prediction for session 2.1 and 2.3 of quality C and quality A goods, respectively,
31
denoting this Y¯ ti . We estimate
Y¯ ti = β1d1
1
t
+ β3d3
1
t
+ γ
(
1− 1
t
)
+ uti
where we let i denote the particular experiment, and t denote time as measured by the
number of market periods in the experiment. We use the difference between mean traded
prices and theoretical predictions as a dependent variable, instead of mean traded prices, as
theoretical predictions differ across different treatments.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. The estimated coefficient of γ is not significantly
different from 0, indicating that the traded prices are not significantly from the theoretical
predictions different near the end of the experimental sessions in this regime.
We then consider price controls that result in outcomes described in the third parts of
Theorems 4 and 5. Hence, we estimate the difference between the traded price and the
theoretical prediction for sessions 2.2 and 2.4 of quality C and quality A goods, respectively.
In session 2.2, the price floor was removed after period 4 and so we only use data until period
4. We estimate
p¯ti(q)−
pmin(q) + pmax(q)
2
= β2d2
1
t
+ β4d4
1
t
+ γ
(
1− 1
t
)
+ uti
where q = C when a price floor is imposed, and q = A when a price ceiling is imposed.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. Note that the model predicts that γ will fall
within the interval [−10, 10], as pmax(q) − pmin(q) = 20 for this experiment for all q ∈ Q;
the estimated coefficient of γ is −8.3, indicating that trade near the end of the experimental
sessions is occurring at prices within the theoretically predicted interval.
6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that while in buyer-seller models with heterogenous quality com-
petitive equilibria may not exist when price controls are present, matching-theoretic stable
outcomes do exist. Furthermore, the predictions of the quality competition model accurately
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predict the behavior of subjects in the laboratory. This experimental agreement is partic-
ularly surprising given the imperfect information available to experimental subjects: they
were informed only of their own valuations and not those of other participants.
The work presented here suggests that matching theory can provide a theoretical basis for
the intuition that price controls induce non-price competition. The theoretical predictions
of Theorems 4 and 5 show that observed quality responds in ways suggested by economic
intuition to price controls. Furthermore, these effects were also seen in the data.
This work also suggests that matching theory and other cooperative game-theoretic ap-
proaches may be useful in other contexts in which competitive equilibria fail to exist. For
instance, when production quotas are imposed (such as due to trade restrictions), competi-
tive equilibria may fail to exist, but such economies may be able to be modeled within the
framework of matching theory, as suggested by Ostrovsky (2008).18 Similarly, in settings
with fixed costs, competitive equilibria often fail to exist due to the nonconvexities inherent
in those settings (see, e.g., Eswaran et al. (1983)), and it may be that stable outcomes ex-
ist in some such markets. Finally, the model described here may also used to understand
markets with imperfect competition—see the recent work by Azevedo and Leshno (2011)
and Azevedo (2011). We conjecture that stability may provide a robust solution concept for
predicting behavior in these settings as well.
18Indeed, the work of Ostrovsky (2008) suggests that such constraints may be incorporated even when the
quota-restricted good is an input to a downstream production process.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
See Theorems 6 and 10 in Hatfield et al. (2011).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Existence follows from Theorem 2 in Hatfield et al. (2011). The quantity predicted is the effi-
cient quantity, and that is part of any stable outcome: see Theorems 3 and 7 in Hatfield et al.
(2011).
For the final part of the proof, we need to show that all contracts (ω, pω) ∈ A transact
at a price pω ∈ [pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)]. There are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose that pω < p
min(q¯) There are two cases to consider:
(a) Suppose that pω < f
b(|Ab| + 1) − f b(|Ab|) + v(b) for some buyer b. Then there
exists a blocking set of the form {(ψ, pψ)} where b(ψ) = b and s(ψ) = s(ω) along
with a price
pψ =
(f b(|Ab|+ 1)− f b(|Ab|) + v(q¯)) + pω
2
.
as both seller and buyer will choose this contract.
(b) Suppose that pω < c
s(|As|)− cs(|As| − 1) + e(q¯) for some seller s = s(ω). Then A
is not individually rational for S, as As − {(ω, pω)} makes s strictly better off.
2. The proof that pω < p
max(q¯) is analogous.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
From Theorems 2, 3, and 6 of Hatfield et al. (2011) a stable outcome exists and is efficient.
Hence it must only include contracts with quality qˆ. The bounds on the prices then follow
from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We first prove existence of a stable outcome. We let
p¯B ≡ max
b∈B
f b(1)− f b(0) + v(qmax) + 1;
note that no contract (ω, pω) with a price pω > p¯
B can be individually rational for any
buyer, and so without loss of generality we may consider the contractual set X¯[pf ] ≡ {x ∈
X : p(x) ∈ [pf , p¯B]}.
PB(Z) ≡
{
(ω, pω) ∈ X[pf , p¯B] : pω = inf
(ω,pω)∈Z
pω
}
P S(Z) ≡
{
(ω, pω) ∈ X[pf , p¯B] : pω = sup
(ω,pω)∈Z
pω
}
We consider a model with augmented preferences, where each agent i is endowed with a
strict ordering ω1 i . . . i ωKi over trades involving i. This induces a strict ordering .i
over sets such that
Zˆ .i Z ⇔ |Zˆ| < |Z| or maxi τ(Z) unionsq τ(Zˆ) ∈ τ(Zˆ)
We define an augmented choice function on X˜[pf ]
Cˆb(Y ) ≡ max
.b
{Z ∈ Cb(PB(Y ))}
for each b ∈ B and
Cˆs(Y ) ≡ max
.s
{Z ∈ Cs(P S(Y ))}
for each s ∈ S, where max. denotes the maximal set according to the order .. Note that
this is a choice function, not a choice correspondence. Existence of a stable outcome A for
these augmented preferences then follows as the existence proof in Hatfield and Kominers
(2011)—note that the assumption of a finite contractual set is not required for the proof of
existence in that work. Finally, since Cˆi(Y ) ∈ Ci(Y ) for all i ∈ B ∪ S and all Y ⊆ X, A is
a stable outcome for the original preferences.
We now characterize the set of stable outcomes, given the price restriction for each case.
There are three cases to consider:
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1. pf < p
max(qˆ): Then the outcome described in Theorem 3 is still feasible, and hence
is stable as it is still individually rational and unblocked. (Note that all blocking sets
would also be blocking sets for the model with no price restrictions.)
2. pmax(q) < pf < p
min(q + 1)− [v(q + 1)− v(q)]: We proceed in several steps:
(a) We first show that pψ = pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))] for all (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈ A where
q(ψ) ≥ q(ω). There are two cases.
i. If pψ < pω + [v(q(ψ)) − v(q(ω))], we have that Z = {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking
set, where b(χ) = b(ω), s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ψ) and
pχ =
pψ + [pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))]]
2
.
This contract is chosen from A ∪ {(χ, pχ)} by b(χ), as it is strictly better for
b(χ) than (ω, pω); it is also chosen from A∪{(χ, pχ)} by s(χ), as it is strictly
better for s(χ) than (ψ, pψ).
19
ii. If pψ > pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))], we have that Z = {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking set,
where b(χ) = b(ψ), s(χ) = s(ω), q(χ) = q(ω) and
pχ =
pω + [pψ − [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))]]
2
.
This contract is chosen from A ∪ {(χ, pχ)} by b(χ), as it is strictly better for
b(χ) than (ψ, pψ); it is also chosen from A∪{(χ, pχ)} by s(χ), as it is strictly
better for s(χ) than (ω, pω).
20
(b) We now show that there are at most two consecutive qualities. Suppose not. Then
there exist (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈ A where q(ψ) > q(ω) + 1. Consider the contract χ
where b(χ) = b(ψ), s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ψ)− 1, and
pχ = pψ − [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ψ)− 1)]− 
19Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) and (ω, pω) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
20Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ω, pω) and (ψ, pψ) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
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for some small  > 0. Note that from part 2a, pψ = pω+[v(q(ψ))−v(q(ω))], which
implies that pχ > pω ≥ pf for  > 0 small enough, and hence (χ, pχ) is a valid
contract. {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking set, as both b(χ) and s(χ) are strictly better off
dropping (ψ, pψ) and choosing (χ, pχ).
21
(c) We now show that if two consecutive qualities are traded in a stable outcome A,
then one of them is traded at the price floor pf . Suppose not. Let (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈
A where q(ψ) = q(ω) + 1. Consider a contract (χ, pχ) such that b(χ) = b(ω),
s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ω), and pχ = pω −  for some small  > 0. {(χ, pχ)} is a
blocking set for  > 0 small enough, as both b(χ) and s(χ) are strictly better off
dropping (ω, pω) and (ψ, pψ) and choosing (χ, pχ)—note that the seller is better
off as he gains almost all the surplus from switching to a more efficient quality.22
(d) We now show that the two traded qualities are q and q + 1. It will be helpful to
define the following notation:
M(q) ≡ arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f b(nb) + v(q)− pf ]
}
where ∑
b∈B
nb = n
To see that the two traded qualities are q and q + 1, suppose not; let the two
traded qualities be q′ and q′ + 1. There are two cases to consider:
i. Suppose that q′ > q; hence, pf < pmin(q′). There are two subcases to consider:
• Suppose that
pmin(q′) = max
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|+ 1)− f b(|Aˆb|) + v(q′)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′). Then at the price
pf the buyers strictly demand at least m + 1 goods of quality q
′, where
21Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) was individually rational for b(χ) and s(χ).
22Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) and (ω, pω) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
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m = maxM(q′); however, there are at most m sellers willing to trade a
quality q′ at a price pf . Hence, either A is not individually rational or
there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ and pχ = pf +  for
 > 0 small enough with a buyer whose demand is not satisfied and a
current seller.
• Suppose that
pmin(q′) = max
s∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q′)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′). Then at the price
pf the buyers strictly demand at least m goods of quality q
′, where m =
minM(q′); while there are at most m−1 sellers willing to trade a quality
q′ at a price pf . Hence either A is not individually rational or there exists
a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ and pχ = pf +  for  > 0 small
enough with a buyer whose demand is not satisfied and a current seller.
ii. Suppose that q′ < q. hence, pf > pmax(q′ + 1). There are two subcases to
consider:
• Suppose that
pmax(q′ + 1) = min
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|)− f b(|Aˆb| − 1) + v(q′ + 1)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′+ 1). Then at the price
pf the buyers demand at most m−1 goods of quality q′+1 or less, where
m = minM(q′ + 1); however, there are at least m sellers willing to trade
a quality q′ + 1 or less at a price pf . Hence either A is not individually
rational or there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ + 1 and
pχ = pf + [v(q
′ + 1)− v(q′)]−  for  > 0 small enough with a seller who
is not satisfied and a current buyer.
• Suppose that
pmax(q′ + 1) = min
S∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q′ + 1)
}
.
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for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′ + 1). Then at the
price pf the buyers demand at most m goods of quality q
′ + 1 or less,
where m = maxM(q′ + 1); however, there are at least m + 1 sellers
willing to trade a quality q′ + 1 or less at a price pf . Hence either A is
not individually rational or there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where
q(χ) = q′ + 1 and pχ = pf + [v(q′ + 1)− v(q′)]−  for  > 0 small enough
with a seller who is not satisfied and a current buyer.
(e) The above results imply that if both q and q + 1 quality goods are traded, they
must be traded at prices pf and pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)]. If only quality q is
traded, it must be traded at pf , as if any other contract of the form (ω, pω) exists,
there will exist a blocking set of the form {(ψ, pω+pf
2
)}, as we know at a price
pf > p
max(q) more sellers will demand to sell a good of quality q then there are
buyers willing to buy such a good. If only quality q + 1 is traded, then it must
trade at pf + [v(q+ 1)− v(q)], as if there exists a contract for a quality q+ 1 good
of the form (ω, pω) where pω > pf + [v(q + 1)− v(q)], then there is a blocking set
of the form {(ψ, pω − [v(q + 1) − v(q)])} where b(ψ) = b(ω), s(ψ) = s(ω), q(ψ) =
q(ω) + 1. If pω < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], there will exist a blocking set of the
form {(ψ, pω+pmin(q+1)
2
)}, as we know at a price pω < pmin(q + 1) more buyers will
demand to buy a good of quality q + 1 then there are sellers willing to sell such
a good.
(f) Finally, we prove that the number of trades is as given in the theorem. Suppose
not. It is clear that if m,m′ ∈ M(q) and m < mˆ < m′, then mˆ ∈ M(q). Hence,
there are two cases to consider:
i. Suppose |A| < m for all m ∈ M(q). Then there exists a buyer b such that
f b(|Ab|) + v(q) − pf > 0. Furthermore, there exists a seller s such that
pf − [cs(|As|) + e(q)] > 0 as we know from the definition of pmax(q) that the
number of items of quality q sellers are willing to sell at pf is strictly greater
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than the number of items buyers are willing to buy. Hence, a set {(χ, pχ)}
such that b(χ) = b, s(χ) = s, q(χ) = q, and pχ = pf constitutes a blocking
set.
ii. Suppose |A| > m for all m ∈ M(q). Then there exists a buyer b such that
f b(|A|b) + v(q)− pf < 0. Then the outcome is not individually rational for b.
(Recall that the buyers are indifferent between the two qualities, given their
prices, in the stable outcome A.)
3. pmax(q+ 1)− [v(q+ 1)− v(q)] < pf < pmin(q+ 1): First, note that steps (a)-(d) of Case
2 still hold. We now show that no contract with a quality q good transacts as part of
a stable outcome. Suppose both qualities do trade in equilibrium. There are two cases
(a) Suppose
pmax(q + 1) = min
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|)− f b(|Aˆb| − 1) + v(q + 1)
}
.
Then since pmax(q + 1) < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], and all buyers recieve the same
utility, there must be less than m buyers, where m = minM(q + 1). However,
sellers wish to sell at least m goods of quality q + 1 at that price. Hence there is
a blocking contract where a seller who is not currently signing a contract offers a
slightly lower price (and quality q + 1) to a buyer currently buying.
(b) Suppose
pmax(q + 1) = min
S∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q + 1)
}
.
Then since pmax(q + 1) < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], and all buyers recieve the same
utility, there are at most m buyers, where m = maxM(q + 1). However, sellers
wish to sell at least m + 1 goods of quality q + 1 at that price. Hence there is a
blocking contract where a seller who is not currently signing a contract offers a
slightly lower price (and quality q + 1) to a buyer currently buying.
The rest of the proof then follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is symmetric to the proof of Theorem 4.
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B Instructions
Introduction Welcome to the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science.
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money
which will be paid to you in cash. We are going to conduct a market in which you will be a
participant in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you
will find a table labeled PAYOFF TABLE that describes the value to you of any decisions
you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private
information. The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will
be in terms of francs. At the end of the experiment, your francs will be converted to dollars,
and paid to you in cash. Your conversion rate is found on your table of values/costs. It may
vary between people. Do not reveal this to anyone. The commodity being bought and sold
comes in 10 different qualities, ranging from A to J. You will be designated as either a buyer
or seller. If you are buyer your PAYOFF TABLE will be titled BUYER RECORD SHEET.
If you are a seller, your PAYOFF TABLE will be labeled SELLER RECORD SHEET.
Specific Instructions to Buyers During each market period you are free to purchase from
any seller or sellers as many units as you want. Each unit is one of ten different qualities,
ranging from A to J. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period, you will receive
the amount listed in the row marked “1st Unit Value” and the column corresponding to the
quality of the item on your TABLE OF VALUES. If you purchase a second unit during that
same period, you repeat the procedure, this time referring to the row marked “2nd Unit
Value”, and so on. Notice that your units increase regardless of the quality of the previous
units purchased. That is, for the first unit you follow the first row, regardless of quality
and for the second unit you follow the second row, regardless of the quality of the first unit.
Similarly for the third unit you follow the third row regardless of the quality of the previous
two unit. Your payoffs are computed as follows: you will receive the difference between the
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value on your table and what you paid for the purchase.
Earnings = Table Value – Purchase Price.
If the value of the item is greater than the purchase price you make money. If the value of the
item is less than the purchase price, you lose money. Your total payoffs will be accumulated
over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Specific Instructions to Sellers During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer
or buyers as many units as you might want. Each unit is one of seven different qualities,
ranging from A to G. The cost of the first unit that you sell during a trading period is listed
in the row marked “1st Unit Cost” and the column corresponding to the quality of the item
on your TABLE OF COSTS. If you sell a second unit during that same period, you repeat
the procedure, this time referring to the row marked “2nd Unit Cost”, and so on. Your
payoffs are computed as follows: you will receive the difference between the sale price of the
unit and its cost on your table.
Earnings = Sale Price – Cost of Unit
If the sale price of the item is greater than the cost you make money. If the sale price
is less than the cost, you lose money. Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several
trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Market Organization The exercise is organized as follows. The market will be conducted
in a series of trading periods. Each period lasts for at most 15 minutes. Any buyer is free
at any time during the period to make a verbal bid to buy a unit of a certain quality at a
specified price. Likewise, any seller is free to make a verbal offer, or “ask”, for one unit of a
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specified quality for a specified price. This is done by stating the quality, your ID number,
and your bid or ask is (example: “quality F, Buyer 2 bids 40” or “quality D, Seller 5 asks
200”.) Bids and asks are recorded on the blackboard by the market manager. Once a new
bid or ask is announced, any new bid for that quality must be higher than the previous bid
and any new ask for that quality must be lower than the previous ask. A unit is traded
when a buyer accepts an existing ask (i.e. calling out “Buyer 2 accepts for quality A”) or
when a seller accepts an existing bid (i.e. calling out “Seller 6 accepts quality G”). When
this happens, the buyer and the seller record the quality, price, and value or cost in the
appropriate column of their Record sheet. Each column represents a trading period. Buyers
and sellers can cancel their own asks or bids by calling out “Seller 7 cancels in quality B”
or “Buyer 3 cancels in quality C”. Except for the bids, asks, and cancellations, you are not
allowed to speak. There are likely to be many bids and asks that are not accepted, but you
are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can.
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C Tables
Table 1: Experiments and conditions
Series Experiment Condition Number of Subjects Number of Periods
1 1.1 No price constraints 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
1 1.2 No price constraints 8 sellers 7 buyers 3
1 1.3 Price floor (6,000) 8 sellers 7 buyers 8
1 1.4 First 3 periods: Price floor (6,000) 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
Last 4 periods: No price constraints
1 1.5 First 6 periods: Price floor (6,000) 7 sellers 7 buyers 8
Last 2 periods: No price constraints
2 2.1 Price floor (1312) 8 sellers 8 buyers 9
2 2.2 First 4 periods: price floor (1,470) 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
Last 3 periods: No price constraints
2 2.3 Price ceiling (1088) 8 sellers 8 buyers 10
2 2.4 Price ceiling (930) 7 sellers 7 buyers 10
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Table 2: Type 1 buyer’s valuation and Type 1 seller’s cost in Series 1
Type 1 buyer’s valuation
Quality
A B C D E F G H I J
Unit
1 5988 6680 7238 7674 8000 8228 8370 8438 8444 8400
2 5388 6080 6638 7074 7400 7628 7770 7838 7844 7800
3 4788 5480 6038 6474 6800 7028 7170 7238 7244 7200
4 4188 4880 5438 5874 6200 6428 6570 6638 6644 6600
5 3588 4280 4838 5274 5600 5828 5970 6038 6044 6000
6 2988 3680 4238 4674 5000 5228 5370 5438 5444 5400
7 2388 3080 3638 4074 4400 4628 4770 4838 4844 4800
8 1788 2480 3038 3474 3800 4028 4170 4238 4244 4200
9 1188 1880 2438 2874 3200 3428 3570 3638 3644 3600
10 588 1280 1838 2274 2600 2828 2970 3038 3044 3000
Type 1 seller’s cost
Quality
A B C D E F G H I J
Unit
1 3413 3690 4013 4377 4781 5220 5693 6195 6725 7278
2 3433 3710 4033 4397 4801 5240 5713 6215 6745 7298
3 3453 3730 4053 4417 4821 5260 5733 6235 6765 7318
4 3473 3750 4073 4437 4841 5280 5753 6255 6785 7338
5 3493 3770 4093 4457 4861 5300 5773 6275 6805 7358
6 3513 3790 4113 4477 4881 5320 5793 6295 6825 7378
7 3533 3810 4133 4497 4901 5340 5813 6315 6845 7398
8 3553 3830 4153 4517 4921 5360 5833 6335 6865 7418
9 3573 3850 4173 4537 4941 5380 5853 6355 6885 7438
10 3593 3870 4193 4557 4961 5400 5873 6375 6905 7458
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Table 3: Type 1 buyer’s valuation and Type 1 seller’s cost in Series 2
Type 1 buyer’s valuation
Quality
A B C
Unit
1 1555 2155 2355
2 1375 1975 2175
3 1195 1795 1995
4 1015 1615 1815
5 835 1435 1635
6 655 1255 1455
7 475 1075 1275
8 295 895 1055
9 115 715 915
9 -65 535 735
Type 1 seller’s cost
Quality
A B C
Unit
1 45 245 845
2 225 425 1025
3 405 605 1205
4 585 785 1385
5 765 965 1565
6 945 1145 1745
7 1125 1325 1925
8 1305 1505 2105
9 1485 1685 2285
10 1665 1865 2465
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Table 4: Efficiency and number of units traded by period for Series 1
Experiment 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
No No With With No With No
price price price price price price price
floor floor floor floor control floor control
Period
1 0.823 0.815 0.597 0.667 0.646
2 0.859 0.875 0.609 0.643 0.651
3 0.913 0.952 0.532 0.641 0.628
4 0.918 0.609 0.789 0.629
5 0.934 0.591 0.953 0.649
6 0.926 0.604 0.961 0.632
7 0.936 0.641 0.988 0.879
8 0.649 0.935
Mean efficiency 0.901 0.881 0.604 0.650 0.923 0.639 0.907
Efficiency
in a stable outcome 1.000 1.000 0.661 0.660 1.000 0.662 1.000
(Theoretical prediction)1
Average number of 43.1 44.3 27.8 32.3 43.3 31.5 36.5
units traded per period
Number of trades
in a stable outcome 44 39 28 32 44 28 39
(Theoretical prediction)1
1 The number of trades and efficiency in stable outcomes differ across sessions because the
number of sellers and buyers differ across sessions.
Table 5: Proportion of trade by quality during the second half periods in Series 1 (percent)
Experimental Treatments A B C D E F G H I J
No price floor 7.6 4.6 12.1 62.1 12.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Periods 5 -7, Experiment 1.1)
With price floor
(Periods 5 -8, Experiment 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 83.6 14.9 0.5 0.5
& Periods 5 -6, Experiment 1.5)
52
Table 6: Coefficient estimates
β1 β2 β3 β4 γ n R
2
Series 1 264.9 -210.7 23.5 36.0 20 0.739
(44.8)1 (96.2) (43.0) (20.8)
Series 2 30.0 -51.0 6.7 19 0.625
(15.7) (16.3) (3.5)
Series 2 -16.3 -5.9 -8.3 17 0.671
(1.8) (4.1) (3.2)
1 Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7: Efficiency and number of units traded by period for Series 2
Experiment 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Price floor Price floor No price Price ceiling Price ceiling
1312 1470 control 1088 930
Period
1 0.711 0.690 0.861 0.809
2 0.835 0.707 0.922 0.750
3 0.814 0.683 0.699 0.683
4 0.777 0.693 0.548 0.608
5 0.708 1.000 0.856 0.677
6 0.772 1.000 0.851 0.676
7 0.778 1.000 0.885 0.677
8 0.736 0.873 0.665
9 0.754 0.910 0.657
10 0.882 0.693
Mean efficiency 0.765 0.693 1.000 0.829 0.690
Efficiency
in a stable outcome 0.664-0.984 0.633 1.000 0.664-0.984 0.635
(Theoretical prediction)
Average number of 41.4 35.5 43.6 48.0 31.8
units traded per period
Number of trades
in a stable outcome 38 34 44 38 30
(Theoretical prediction)
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Table 8: Proportion of trade by quality during the second half periods in Series 2 (percent)
Experimental Treatments A B C
Price floor 1312 (Experiment 2.1) 1.6 49.4 49.0
Price floor 1470 (Periods 1-4, Experiment 2.2) 1.4 5.5 93.1
No price control (Periods 5-7, Experiment 2.2) 2.8 93.1 4.1
Price ceiling 1088 (Experiment 2.3) 26.0 72.2 1.8
Price ceiling 930 (Experiment 2.4) 97.5 2.5 0.0
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